This site spends most of its time saying what went wrong. This page does the other half. For each open problem in Manteno's government, it sets out the lever that already exists in state law or the Village's own code to resolve it, who can pull it, and the vote it takes. Nothing here requires a court, a new law, or an election. Most of it takes one motion at one meeting.
Two things to keep in mind. First, in an Illinois village the president nominates and the board consents; almost every deadlock below is one side declining to do its half. Second, the numbers matter: seven people sit at the table (the president and six trustees), a quorum is four, an ordinance or a spending item needs four of seven including the president, and four trustees can pass anything over a veto.
Published September 22, 2026. Every statute and code section on this page was read in its current form on that date, on ilga.gov and in the Manteno Village Code (American Legal, current through Ordinance 25-37). Where the law is unsettled we say so.
Every fix below runs through one of these counts. Manteno's board of trustees is the president and six trustees (65 ILCS 5/3.1-45-5). The president votes only in three situations (65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-30).
Quorum: four of seven. A majority of the corporate authorities, and the president counts (65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-20; Manteno Code § 1-6-4). Two trustees and the president is not a quorum, which is what happened on August 17.
An ordinary motion (an appointment, a minutes approval, a rules suspension): a majority of those voting, with a quorum present. The president may vote if the trustees tie, or if three of the six vote yes with no tie, or if a supermajority is required (3.1-40-30). A 3 to 3 vote with the president in favor passes 4 to 3.
An ordinance, or any motion that spends money or creates a liability: four of seven, including the president (65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-40; Manteno § 1-6-5, Rule 7). The bills list is a spending motion; that is why the August 3 bills failed 2 to 4.
A veto: the president, in writing, at the next regular meeting at least five days after passage, and only for ordinances and spending or liability motions (65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-45; § 1-5-7). Not returned in time, the item takes effect anyway.
An override: four trustees (two-thirds of the six holding office, president not counted) at the next regular meeting after the objection is received (65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-50).
Restoring an officer the president has removed: two-thirds "of all members authorized by law to be elected" of the corporate authorities (65 ILCS 5/3.1-35-10). On the plain text that is two-thirds of seven, so five. No Illinois court has decided whether the president is in that count. The trustees have four.
Discontinuing an appointed office altogether: two-thirds of the corporate authorities, by ordinance taking effect at the end of the fiscal year, with the duties assigned to another officer (65 ILCS 5/3.1-30-5(b)).
The mayor: "it is my meeting and it's up to me what's on the agenda" (August 12). Trustee comments removed from the agenda in September with no vote. Trustees have answered by calling special meetings.
The problem. Nothing in the Manteno Code assigns the agenda to the president. The only mention is § 1-19-5(C), which has the administrator "assist the president and committee chairmen with the preparation of the agenda," and there is no administrator. Rule 18 of § 1-6-5 sets the order of business; it neither requires nor forbids a trustee comment period. State law gives the board, not the president, the power to "determine its own rules of proceeding" (65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-15, applied to villages by 3.1-45-5).
The board's tools. Two, one permanent and one for a single night. Permanent: an ordinance amending § 1-6-5 that says how items get on the agenda (for example, any two trustees may place an item by written request to the clerk a set number of days ahead) and restores a trustee comment item to Rule 18. Because Manteno's rules are codified by ordinance, a lasting change has to be an ordinance: four of seven votes including the president. The president may veto it; four trustees may pass it over the veto at the next regular meeting. The four trustees who called the September 16 meeting have exactly the votes to do both. Single night: § 1-6-7 lets "the majority of the members present" suspend any rule of order not prescribed by statute. A motion to suspend the rules and take up an item is not an ordinance and spends no money, so it cannot be vetoed. The order of business in Rule 18 is a rule of order, and it can be suspended the same way to hear trustee comments.
The president's tools. She presides, and until the board writes a rule she prepares the agenda in practice. She can end the dispute by adopting a written agenda procedure with the board, or simply by placing trustee requests on the agenda.
Four clerks in fifteen months. The office is empty again. The mayor named a temporary clerk on September 21 under a section that does not fit.
The problem. Manteno's clerk is an elected office (§ 1-8-1). When it falls vacant, the president "must appoint a qualified person to hold the office until the office is filled by election, subject to the advice and consent of the board of trustees" (65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-50(f)(3)); the Village's own code says the same thing in fewer words (§ 1-8-3). The 30-day "temporary officer" power in § 1-5-5(E) is for appointed officers who die, are disabled, are convicted, are dismissed or abandon the post. It is not the clerk's section and resignation is not on its list. The Village has done this correctly before: on June 1, 2026 the board voted 6 to 0 to appoint Steven Orth clerk and swore him in the same night.
The president's tool. Put a nomination on the next agenda. Allen Pickrel, whom she named on September 21, would be confirmed in one roll call if the board agrees; the board has said it has nothing against him. That is the whole procedure.
The board's tools. Consent, or withhold it and say why. The board cannot name a clerk without a nomination. It can, and should, insist that the appointment be made the lawful way, because a clerk seated without consent leaves every warrant she countersigns and every notice she serves open to challenge.
The FOIA workload is a separate fix. The last clerk resigned over it. The clerk's pay is fixed at $4,000 a year by § 1-8-4 and cannot be raised to take effect during the current term, because a person filling an elected office's vacancy is expressly excluded from the mid-term raise rule (65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-5). But the Freedom of Information Act does not put FOIA on the clerk at all. "Each public body shall designate one or more officials or employees to act as its Freedom of Information officer or officers" (5 ILCS 140/3.5). The Village can designate any staff member, more than one, and pay that as a staff job; the designee must complete the Attorney General's online training within 30 days. The Village already treats this as a separate appointment: the August 17 agenda carried "Motion to appoint Crystal Wolfe to FOIA Officer" as its own item.
The mayor says she will appoint rather than post, and will not hire an administrator before April. The board voted the code officer down 2 to 3 over a budget question. Meanwhile the code's approval chain for bills has nobody in it.
The problem. Both offices are appointed "by the president, with the advice and consent of the board of trustees" (§ 1-19-2 for the administrator, § 1-22-1 for the director of building and zoning; 65 ILCS 5/3.1-30-5(a)). Neither side can fill them alone. There is no "building inspector" office in the code; § 1-22-4 says any reference to a code enforcement officer means the director of building and zoning. An acting administrator during an absence is appointed the same way, president with consent (§ 1-19-7).
The president's tools. Nominate. She may nominate anyone, including Jim Paicz again, at any meeting, and if the trustees split 3 to 3 she breaks the tie. Where the prior officer was dismissed or abandoned the office (not where he retired), she may name a 30-day temporary officer without consent, at most twice in a fiscal year (§ 1-5-5(E)). Posting the jobs is not required by the code, but nothing prevents it, and the board's stated objection on September 8 was the budget line, not the candidate.
The board's tools. Four. The budget: every appropriation and every bills list needs four of seven (3.1-40-40), so the board can put the salary line in writing and remove the objection it raised on September 8, or refuse to fund a hire made outside the code. The salary: the administrator's salary "shall be determined by the president and trustees on an annual basis" (§ 1-19-10). Consent: withhold it, with reasons on the record. The nuclear option: by a two-thirds vote the corporate authorities may discontinue an appointed office at fiscal year end and assign its duties to another officer (3.1-30-5(b)); that is how a board that cannot get a nomination reorganises around the vacancy. Any multi-year contract for an administrator or attorney is made by the president and trustees together (65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(b)), so a contract signed by one side alone is not the Village's.
The interim fix the board already tried. The B&F Construction Code Services agreement approved 4 to 0 on September 16 is a professional services contract for inspections. It spends money, so it was vetoable and was vetoed. The override is four trustees on October 5. If it passes, the Village has inspections under a written contract while the director's office is filled the lawful way.
Since June 15 the Village has had an attorney the president appointed and the board refused, and an attorney the board restored and the president removed. The Village is paying neither side's bills the way the code contemplates.
The problem. The village attorney is appointed by the president with the board's consent (§ 1-9-2; 3.1-30-5(a)(5)). The president can remove an appointed officer on a written charge, but must report her reasons "at a meeting" held 5 to 10 days later; if she fails to, or if two-thirds of the corporate authorities disapprove, the officer "shall be restored" (65 ILCS 5/3.1-35-10). The Village has admitted in writing that no such report was made at any meeting (FOIA 26-173). The trustees voted three times, with four votes each time, to disapprove the removal or retain him; on the plain text two-thirds of seven is five. Neither side has a clean claim to the office, which is why a judge now has it.
The president's tools. The office is hers to fill, and she can end the standoff at any meeting by nominating someone four trustees will confirm, or by re-nominating Cainkar. Nothing in 3.1-35-10 or 3.1-30-5 bars re-nominating a removed officer. A confirmed successor who qualifies displaces any holdover (3.1-30-5(d)). Serial 30-day temporary appointments of the same person are capped at two per fiscal year by her own code (§ 1-5-5(E)) and were the exact practice the Attorney General warned against in Opinion 94-012.
The board's tools. Consent to a nominee. Refuse to pay invoices for counsel the board never approved, which it is doing (the treasurer, September 9: "It has not been board approved"). Retain its own legislative counsel by a majority of the trustees for ordinance drafting, opinions on the board's powers and "analysis of the validity of actions taken by the village" (§ 1-9-4, a power Westmont's board did not have). And, if it wants the strongest legal ground, rest on the missed report rather than the four-vote disapprovals: the restoration clause is automatic and does not depend on counting the president.
What the board cannot do. Hire a village attorney on its own. The appointment power "lies solely with" the president subject to consent (Pechous v. Slawko), and a board that retained its own firm over a mayor's objection was enjoined (Village of Westmont v. Lenihan). Cainkar's June 30 engagement letter, sent to the administrator, is the Village's weakest document on the trustees' side.
On September 21 the mayor vetoed all three actions of the September 16 special meeting under a section that covers ordinances.
The problem. A president may veto ordinances and motions that create a liability, spend money or sell property (65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-45), by returning them with written objections at the next regular meeting at least five days after passage. Manteno's § 1-5-7 speaks only of ordinances. A motion approving minutes creates no liability and spends nothing; it cannot be vetoed. The B&F contract can be.
The board's tools. On the two minutes motions: treat them as in force, because they are, and direct that the approved minutes be posted within ten days as the Open Meetings Act requires (5 ILCS 120/2.06(b)). On the contract: reconsider it at the next regular meeting after the objection was received, which is Monday, October 5, 2026, and pass it "notwithstanding the mayor's refusal" on the votes of four trustees, by roll call, recorded in the journal (3.1-40-50). The four who voted for it on September 16 are enough. If the president's written objection was never delivered, the item took effect on its own (3.1-40-45, last sentence; § 1-5-7, "deemed to have approved").
The president's tools. A veto is a written objection returned at a regular meeting; a statement read aloud is not enough on its own. If she means to veto the contract, the objection should be in writing and in the record. She may also simply negotiate the contract she said on September 17 she now supports.
Two trustees can call one. The code routes the call through a clerk the Village does not have.
The problem. "Special meetings may be held at any time on call of the president or any two or more trustees; such call shall be in writing, duly signed, and shall be presented to the clerk, who shall proceed immediately to cause notice of the same to be served upon the president and trustees in person or by registered letter" (§ 1-6-3). State law separately requires 48 hours' public notice with the agenda, posted at the Village's office and on its website, and sent to any news outlet that has asked (5 ILCS 120/2.02). Nothing in the Open Meetings Act mentions a clerk; the notice duty runs to the public body.
The board's tools. Until a clerk is seated, the callers can do the clerk's part themselves: a signed written call, served on every official in person or by registered letter, with the notice and agenda posted 48 hours ahead and sent to the newspaper. Keep the proof of service. Then the meeting cannot be attacked on the one ground the mayor raised on September 21, "it wasn't in writing and it wasn't served by the clerk."
The president's tools. Nominate a clerk (section 2 above). Attend. The mayor's own reading of § 1-6-3 into the record on September 21 confirms that two trustees may call a meeting without her.
August 17: four trustees absent, no quorum, and the police chief sent to a trustee's door under Rule 21.
The problem. Without four members physically present nothing can be done except adjourn and "compel the attendance of absentees under penalties (including a fine for a failure to attend) prescribed by the council by ordinance" (65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-20). Manteno's ordinance on the point is Rule 21 of § 1-6-5, written in 1974, which has a police officer notify absentees and, on refusal, "without warrant, arrest such member." It requires a direction by "a majority of the trustees present" and exempts members "unable through sickness to attend."
Remote attendance exists, with a limit. Manteno adopted § 1-6-10 (Ordinance 26-02), vetoed by the mayor and passed over the veto 4 to 2 on June 15, 2026. A member who cannot attend because of illness or disability, work or Village business, a family or other emergency, unexpected childcare, or military duty may attend by video or audio, after notice to the clerk and administrator, and votes by roll call. But state law lets a member attend remotely only if "a quorum of the members of the public body is physically present" (5 ILCS 120/7(a)), and a majority of the body must allow it. Remote attendance cannot create a quorum. On August 17, with two trustees and the president in the room, no one could have been admitted by phone. On a night when four are present, a fifth who is ill can be.
The board's tools. Replace Rule 21. The statute expressly allows a fine for failure to attend, set by ordinance (up to the $750 cap in 65 ILCS 5/1-2-1); an ordinance amending § 1-6-5 to substitute a fine for the arrest mechanism is four of seven, vetoable, overridable. And use § 1-6-10: a trustee who is sick or working can give 48 hours' notice and attend from home whenever four others will be in the room.
The president's tools. Schedule meetings when the members can attend; the September 16 complaint from the floor was that 7:00 a.m. excluded two trustees, and the same objection applies to the August 25 cancellation that pushed the appointment vote onto a date a trustee had said he could not make.
The last board minutes on the Village website are for June 25, 2026. Nine meetings since have none. The June 15 minutes record a closed session with no exception recited.
The problem. A public body "shall approve the minutes of its open meeting within 30 days after that meeting or at the public body's second subsequent regular meeting, whichever is later," and a body with a website "shall post the minutes of a regular meeting" within 10 days after approval (5 ILCS 120/2.06(b)). Every motion to go into closed session must cite the specific exception and be recorded with the vote of each member (5 ILCS 120/2a). Approving minutes is a motion that spends nothing; it cannot be vetoed.
The board's tools. Approve the outstanding minutes at any regular meeting and direct the clerk, or in the clerk's absence the recording secretary, to post them. The board can also adopt a standing rule that closed-session motions be read with the statutory citation. Any person may file a Request for Review with the Attorney General's Public Access Counselor within 60 days of a violation, or within 60 days of discovering it up to two years later (5 ILCS 120/3.5), or sue in circuit court (5 ILCS 120/3).
The president's tools. Place the minutes on the agenda (she prepares it), sign them, and see that they are posted. The Open Meetings Act duties fall on the public body as a whole; she presides over it.
The finance chair, September 21: "there's one person that's verifying payroll in the village." An informal $5,000 email rule for purchases was floated the same night.
The problem. The code's controls assume a clerk and an administrator. "All warrants drawn upon the treasurer must be signed by the president of the village and countersigned by the village clerk … and no money shall be otherwise paid than upon warrants so drawn" (§ 1-5-9). "Every bill against the village shall first be submitted to the village administrator or his designee, who shall examine it, and if he finds it correct, shall approve it in writing," and the board approves the list at its regular meeting; salaries and wages are paid biweekly "in accordance with the salary and wage schedules approved from time to time by the board of trustees" (§ 1-21-5). Purchases above $3,000 need board approval; between $3,000 and $10,000 the president may approve an exigent purchase in writing; emergency purchases require "the prior consensus of not less than four trustees" (§ 1-19-5(O), (P); § 1-21-6(H)). A $5,000 email threshold is not in the code and cannot replace it.
The board's tools. The bills list is a four-of-seven spending vote every regular meeting; the board can require that each list come with the written approval the code demands and decline lists that do not. It approves the wage schedules; it can require a second signature on payroll by resolution, naming who signs while the administrator's office is vacant. It can amend the purchasing thresholds by ordinance if it wants the number to be $5,000, rather than let an informal rule sit beside a code that says $3,000. The finance committee can ask the treasurer for a written reconciliation of vacation and pay owed to departed staff, which nobody in the room on September 21 could state.
The president's tools. Nominate an administrator and a clerk, because the code's two signatures are those two offices and nothing in Title 1 supplies a substitute other than a deputy clerk, whose authority depends on a sitting clerk (§ 1-8-5(E)). Until then, put a designee for § 1-21-5 in writing so bills have the approval the code requires.
Filed July 10 by the mayor's appointed counsel against four trustees, with no board authorization on file. Dismissed July 21, revived, now set for November 12.
The problem. The Village has certified that no resolution, motion, minutes or memo authorizes the suit (FOIA 26-167, item 4). The Village is not paying the lawyer who filed it, and on September 21 paid $2,931.73 to the firm defending the trustees. A village's contracts for legal services are made by the president and trustees together (65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(b); Westmont).
The board's tools. A resolution stating that the Village did not authorize the litigation and does not consent to it, and directing that no Village funds be spent prosecuting it. Whether counsel must then withdraw is for the court, but the resolution puts the Village's position in the record the judge will read. The board can also consent to a nominee for village attorney, which moots the case.
The president's tools. Dismiss it and nominate; or take it to judgment on November 12. She has chosen the second. A declaratory judgment on who the attorney is would end the argument either way.
Manteno police have used Flock cameras for years. No ordinance, agenda item or roll call authorizing them has been produced.
The problem. A services contract can be signed within the administrator's discretionary authority without the board ever seeing it (§ 1-21-6). State law restricts how ALPR data may be shared and requires written declarations from out-of-state agencies (625 ILCS 5/2-130), but it does not require a board vote to install the cameras.
The board's tools. An ordinance, under the Village's general ordinance and police powers (65 ILCS 5/1-2-1, 11-1-1), that requires board authorization before any surveillance technology is acquired or renewed, sets retention, sharing and audit rules at least as strict as 2-130, and requires the annual audit the department's own Policy 434 already promises. The board can also lower the contract threshold in § 1-21-6 to zero for surveillance systems. The chief offered a public session on the cameras on September 9; the board can put it on an agenda.
The president's tools. Bring the existing contract and policy to the board for ratification, which costs nothing and answers the question residents asked on September 8.
The board paid part of Greene Forensic's final bill on August 12 and declined the rest. The mayor warned that could bring a lawsuit.
The problem. The engagement was a $168,000 fixed contract plus a $20,000 retainer, approved on the mayor's tie-breaking vote on August 4, 2025. The Village's own correspondence shows $38,640 outstanding as of April 25, 2026; the August 12 agenda carried a $12,270.92 "Final Audit Invoice."
The board's tools. Paying or not paying a bill is a four-of-seven spending vote, and the board holds it. If it disputes the invoice, the tool is a written dispute to the firm citing the contract term it relies on, adopted by motion, so the refusal is a position rather than a silence. If it does not, the tool is to pay.
The president's tools. Put the invoice on the bills list with the contract and the firm's statement of work attached, so the vote is on the paper rather than the argument.
Almost every item above resolves with one of two motions: the president nominates and four members consent, or four trustees pass an ordinance and, if needed, pass it again over a veto. The two offices that the code's own controls depend on, clerk and administrator, are empty because the first motion has not been made. The rules that would end the agenda fight have not been written because the second has not been tried. None of this needs a court.
We will keep this page current. When any of these tools is used, the section will say so, with the date and the vote.