Ordinance 26-2554

Eight stop signs, and no one measured anything

In July 2026 the Village of Bourbonnais put all-way stop signs at eight intersections. The village released its records. They show a real complaint from real residents, a police memo containing no data of any kind, and a decision made in one night.

8
intersections changed
adopted 6 to 0
0
traffic counts taken
at any location
0
speeds measured
before or after
2
correctable crashes in two years
all eight combined
0
injuries at any of them
2023 and 2024
1
night, both readings
rules suspended

01 / What happened

A text message became an ordinance

In July 2025 a resident of River Street sent a text message to her village trustee. She could not walk her grandchildren down her own block. The sidewalks were broken, and cars came through too fast. Put stop signs at Bisaillon and at Drummond, she wrote.

A second trustee heard a similar complaint about Patriot Way and emailed staff on a Saturday morning. The police department wrote something up. In June, Public Works forwarded it to the mayor and the village attorney and called it a traffic study. On July 6 the board adopted eight of the nine locations, taking both readings in a single meeting, and voted 6 to 0.

Nothing in these records suggests anyone profited. No contractor, no developer, no money changes hands anywhere in the file, and the residents who complained had a real problem. That is worth saying plainly before anything else, because the criticism that follows is about method, not motive.

02 / The rule

Stop signs are not speed control devices

A stop sign assigns right of way. That is its job. It tells a driver who goes first where two roads cross. It is not a speed management tool, and the national manual that governs every traffic sign in the country says so directly.

Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, 11th Edition, Section 2B.06

"YIELD or STOP signs shall not be used for speed control."

The word that matters is shall not. The manual has tiers. A Standard uses "shall" and is mandatory. Guidance uses "should." An Option uses "may." This sentence is a Standard, the manual's highest tier.

Illinois says it twice more. IDOT's manual for local roads repeats it at Section 39-2.08(b). And Illinois law makes the manual binding on villages rather than advisory:

625 ILCS 5/11-304

"All such traffic control devices shall conform to the State Manual and Specifications and shall be justified by traffic warrants stated in the Manual."

In most states the manual is best practice. In Illinois, justifying a device by the manual's warrants is a statutory duty placed on local authorities. Illinois adopted the 11th Edition on March 2, 2026, four months before this ordinance.

The rule exists because stop signs barely affect speed. Drivers slow for roughly 200 feet, then make up the time in between. The Federal Highway Administration watched 31,212 vehicles at stop signs and found 67.6 percent did not stop; a 2012 study of 2,400 vehicles found only 35 percent came to a complete stop. Compliance is documented as worse at signs drivers judge unnecessary, and that habit does not stay at the unnecessary sign. See the research listed at the end of this page.

An important limit, stated up front. The prohibition is about purpose, not outcome. A stop sign that legitimately qualifies and happens to slow traffic is entirely proper. And the warrants describing when an all-way stop qualifies are written as options ("may be installed"), not requirements, so failing a warrant does not make a stop sign illegal. The mandatory piece is narrower: you may not install one because you want to slow people down. That is why the village's own wording matters so much.

03 / The village's own words

What the police report gives as the reason

Patrol Commander Brent Barrie's report is five pages on police department letterhead. It covers repaving Larry Power Road, repainting a curb near the Dairy Queen, replacing weathered no parking signs, and a list of intersections that could use stop signs. It is a competent officer's punch list.

Here is the stated purpose at each stop sign location, in the report's own words. Emphasis added.

The Grove playground

"Stop sign additions will regulate traffic speed around the Grove playground area."

Latham Park

"Creating a 4-way stop intersection will slow all drivers in the area."

River Street

"The placement of stop signs on River St ... would regulate motorist speed in the area."

Stratford Drive West

"These newly implemented stop signs would regulate motorist speeds in the area."

E. John Casey at Edgemere

"Creating a 4-way stop at the intersection would regulate speeding motorist on E John Casey Rd."

Highpoint Circle N

"Placement of stop signs on Highpoint Cir N @ Burning Bush to regulate the speed on Highpoint Cir N. (Trustee Littrell)"

Patriot Way at Kathy

"Placement of stop signs on Patriot Way @ Kathy Dr to regulate speed on Patriot Way. (Trustee Toepfer)"

Seven of the nine locations. Public Works Director Terry Memenga told the Daily Journal the same thing on July 7: "They're used to flying through. So the goal is to slow down the traffic."

Note the two parenthetical attributions. Highpoint Circle and Patriot Way are labeled with the name of the trustee who asked for them, and those two entries are also the only two in the report with no supporting reasoning at all. No park, no school crossing, no complaint volume, no road characteristic. One sentence and a name. Every other location gets a paragraph.

What the report does not contain

ElementPresent in the record?
Traffic volume countsNone
Speed measurements or radar dataNone
Crash history at any locationNone
Sight distance measurementsNone
Pedestrian counts at the park locationsNone
Any reference to the MUTCD or its warrantsNone
Review by a professional engineerNone
Posted speed limits mentioned2

Two posted speed limits, both 25 miles per hour, are the only quantitative facts in the document. The national manual asks for something specific here: Section 2B.12 says the decision to establish all-way stop control "should be based on an engineering study." Schedule A of the village's own ordinance says that prior to passage, all intersections "shall be verified against Village street records and any required engineering determinations." No record of any such verification was produced.

The document changes name as it travels. Commander Barrie calls it a "road sign report" in his own emails. Public Works Director Memenga's June 4 memo to the mayor, the administrator and the village attorney calls it "a traffic study conducted by Bourbonnais Police Department." The July 6 meeting minutes say Commander Barrie "conducted the traffic study." The document itself never changes.

04 / The record

How it moved, step by step

Read as a whole, the documented board-level review of this ordinance consists of one trustee saying he would drive past the locations.

05 / The crash record

What the data actually shows

The manual's crash warrant asks a specific question: at a four-leg intersection, are there five or more reported crashes in a twelve month period, of a type an all-way stop could correct? We pulled all 525 crashes the Illinois Department of Transportation recorded in Bourbonnais for 2023 and 2024, located each intersection against street centerline geometry, and counted by true distance.

Crashes at each intersection, 2023 and 2024 combined

Within 100 feet of the intersection. Red line marks the MUTCD crash warrant threshold of five in twelve months.

warrant threshold

Source: IDOT Open Data crash files for 2023 and 2024, filtered to Bourbonnais. Intersection coordinates derived from OpenStreetMap street centerline geometry. The count is stable: widening the search to 165 feet gives four crashes across all eight, and to 330 feet gives six. Zero injuries at any radius up to 650 feet.

The crash warrant is met at none of the eight intersections. The highest count anywhere is one crash in a year, not within a factor of five of the threshold. Both crashes recorded at the intersections were property damage only, and both happened where a stop sign already stood on the minor approach.

The warrant asks specifically about crashes "of a type susceptible to correction by all-way stop control." Widen the search to 330 feet and the total rises to six, but four of those six are cars striking a parked vehicle or a fixed object, which a stop sign does not prevent. Only two crashes in two years, across all eight intersections, are of the type this ordinance could have addressed.

Across the whole village there were ten crashes involving a pedestrian or a cyclist in those two years. None was at any of the eight intersections; seven were at signalized intersections on the main arterials. That cuts both ways. It undercuts the pedestrian danger premise at these specific locations, and it points at where the village's real pedestrian risk sits, which is not where the village put its stop signs.

What this does not prove, and one open gap. A low crash count is not proof an intersection is safe. A genuinely dangerous crossing with light traffic can go years without a reported crash, minor collisions often go unreported, and near misses appear in no dataset at all. What this analysis establishes is that the crash warrant is not met and that nothing in the village's record shows anyone checked. Separately, Illinois had not published 2025 crash data at the time of writing and the village produced nothing responsive to a request for it, so a 2025 spike cannot be ruled out.

06 / The substitution

The one piece of engineering reasoning, overwritten

The report contains exactly one location-specific technical rationale, and it is sound reasoning:

Barrie report, River Street

"Drummond St and Pallisard Dr are slightly offset streets where they meet at River St. The placement of stop signs on River St at these intersections would create a hybrid 4-way stop."

The ordinance the board adopted does not say Pallisard. It says Bisaillon.

What the police department recommended

River St at Drummond, and River St at Pallisard Drive
About 475 feet apart. Stated reason: the offset streets form a hybrid four-way stop.

What the ordinance adopted

River St at Drummond, and River St at Bisaillon Avenue
About 1,725 feet apart, roughly a third of a mile. A separate intersection in a different block. The hybrid four-way rationale does not apply.

Bisaillon and Drummond are the two streets named in the resident's July 2025 text message to Trustee Littrell. There is nothing wrong with a resident making a suggestion, or a trustee carrying it forward. That is how representation is supposed to work. The problem is narrower and is about documentation: the only technical reasoning in the entire file was replaced, and no document produced by the village explains why or by whom.

Commander Barrie wrote on June 1 that his updated report contained "2 additions." Neither copy of the report the village released contains Bisaillon. Both carry the January date and both still say Pallisard. The changes first appear in Memenga's June 4 memo, with no police department document behind them.

07 / The Grove

Is a stop sign at the busiest playground in town actually safe?

This is the fairest question anyone has asked about this ordinance, and the honest answer is not the one a critic would want. Probably yes, it is safe. And that makes the missing study worse, not better.

A stop sign at a park entrance is not improper under the manual. The MUTCD expressly lists "the need to control vehicle/pedestrian conflicts near locations that generate high pedestrian volumes" among the factors an engineering study may weigh. A busy playground qualifies, so the Grove is arguably the most defensible location in the whole ordinance. The best crash evidence agrees: the landmark study by Lovell and Hauer examined all-way stop conversions in San Francisco, Philadelphia and Toronto and found pedestrian crashes fell roughly 39 to 43 percent. It carries a four-star rating in FHWA's Crash Modification Factor Clearinghouse and appears in the Highway Safety Manual.

So where does the worry come from?

From a mechanism the federal manual itself names. MUTCD Section 2B.07: "Safety concerns associated with multi-way stops include pedestrians, bicyclists, and all road users expecting other road users to stop." A stop sign protects a pedestrian by teaching them cars will stop. If enough drivers roll through, that lesson is false. Two things make this worth taking seriously at a playground.

Compliance is genuinely poor. FHWA observed 67.6 percent of drivers failing to stop. A 2012 study found 35 percent making a complete stop. A national survey of behavior at stop signs in school zones reported roughly a third of drivers still violating the sign with child pedestrians present.

Young children are the worst possible users of that assumption. They may be physically unable to detect vehicles approaching faster than about 20 miles per hour, because a faster car looms less in the visual field and can register as not approaching at all. Ten-year-olds crossing leave roughly 1.1 seconds of margin where adults leave 2.0. In one study of five and six year olds crossing real roads, 60 percent did not stop at the curb and no more than 41 percent looked for traffic.

An honest limit on that argument. No study has actually demonstrated the false-security effect for stop signs. It is a documented professional concern, named in the MUTCD and in FHWA training material, and one 2020 study of conversions in Washington DC did find a statistically significant increase in pedestrians struck by vehicles traveling straight through. But that study controlled for neither traffic volume nor pedestrian exposure, so more children crossing there would look identical to more risk. Anyone telling you the research proves stop signs endanger pedestrians is overstating it, and this page will not.

So two serious studies point opposite ways, and the difference between them is almost certainly driver compliance, which is to say whether this is a sign drivers respect. That is measurable. An officer with a clipboard at the Grove for two hours could count it. If compliance is high, the sign is doing exactly what Commander Barrie hoped and the village should say so loudly. If a third of drivers roll it, the village has taught several hundred children a day to expect something that will not reliably happen, and what it needs there is enforcement rather than another sign somewhere else.

The village did not count, before or after. The one location where the safety case was strongest is also where the missing study would have mattered most, and where finding out would have been easiest.

08 / The other side

The strongest case for the village

This case is better than critics usually allow, and it deserves to be made properly.

The problem is real even though it is undocumented. Two trustees heard it independently. A grandmother wrote a paragraph about being unable to walk children down her own street. The police report states the department "routinely receives speeding complaints" from River Street residents and from the Briarcliff homeowners association. The village produced no complaint log, but that is a records keeping failure, not evidence the complaints did not happen.

Failing a warrant does not prohibit a stop sign, and one warrant arguably fits. All five all-way stop warrants are written as options. Warrant E covers "other factors" and explicitly contemplates installation at an intersection of two residential neighborhood collector streets, or "where pedestrian and/or bicyclist movements support the installation." Four of the eight sit beside a park, a school walking path, or a grocery store. A village defending this decision has real ground to stand on, provided it had done the engineering study the manual asks for and documented those pedestrian movements.

Crash data is a lagging indicator, and the intervention is cheap. The crash warrant asks a village to wait until five collisions have happened before acting; at a playground entrance, declining to wait for a child to be hit is a defensible moral position, not an evasion. And eight stop signs cost a few thousand dollars, where speed humps or a signal cost far more and are far harder to undo. That asymmetry genuinely favors trying something.

Responsiveness is not corruption, and the village produced the records. A resident contacts a trustee, the trustee raises it with staff, the board votes in public and signs its name. The trustee attributions in the police report are evidence of transparency, not of a back room. Commander Barrie wrote those names down himself. And the village released internal emails, a trustee's personal text messages and both memos in eight calendar days, in response to an informal request from a resident. Many municipalities would have sent the ordinance and nothing else.

09 / The verdict

Three questions with three different answers

Was the motive legitimate?

Yes. Nothing in this record suggests bad faith by anyone. No vendor benefits, no developer benefits, no money moves. Residents raised a real concern and their elected officials acted on it.

Was the process adequate?

No. A police narrative containing no data was renamed a traffic study as it moved up the chain. It bypassed the Public Works Committee entirely, since no committee meeting was held in June or July. It arrived at the board with no staff report and was adopted the same night on a suspended rules motion. Six trustees voted yes without a single number in front of them.

Is the village safer now?

Possibly, but not for the reason the village gave, and nobody measured it. The published research points two ways at once, and it is worth being precise about which way each part points.

On crashes, the evidence favors the signs. A North Carolina study of 53 conversions to all-way stop found a 68 percent drop in total crashes and 77 percent in injury crashes, with rear-end collisions up 6 percent. It would be wrong to claim these signs make the intersections more dangerous, and this page does not claim it.

On speed, the reason the village actually gave, the evidence runs one way and it is against. Every study located here found the same thing: the reduction is confined to roughly 200 feet of the sign, drivers make up the time in between, and peak speeds tend to rise slightly. The village bought a device that reliably does something it never said it wanted, and reliably fails at the thing it did.

So the sharpest criticism is not that the village made anyone less safe. It is that eight intersections were changed on the strength of a document containing no numbers, for a stated purpose the governing manual forbids, and the village built in no way to ever learn whether any of it helped.

10 / What would fix it

A cheap, specific ask

The useful response is not to demand the signs come down. They are installed, some residents are pleased, and removing a stop sign is politically harder than adding one. The useful response is to measure. A speed trailer at each of the eight locations for one week, now and again in six months, would cost very little and would settle the question permanently. The police department already owns the equipment and ran this kind of study on Career Center Road in 2023, measuring over 100,000 vehicles.

Three questions a resident could reasonably put to the board. One: was any engineering determination made before passage, as Schedule A of your own ordinance requires, and if so may the public see it? Two: will the village run a speed and compliance study at these eight locations and publish the results, so the next decision has data behind it? Three: Trustee King told the board that "a second round of additions may be seen in the future." Will that round be based on measurement, and will it go through the Public Works Committee?

11 / Sources and right of reply

Everything here comes from these documents

Village records obtained under FOIA request 26-2307, produced July 15, 2026. Copies available on request. Research sources were located and checked individually; where a figure reaches us through a later paper rather than the original, that is noted in the entry.

The documents this page is built from · 6 records obtained under FOIA, plus the ordinance
  • Traffic Safety / Road Improvement Report, Cmdr. Brent Barrie, Bourbonnais Police Department, dated January 21, 2026 (the document referred to as the traffic study)
  • Memo, Additional Traffic Signage, Terrence Memenga, Director of Public Works, June 4, 2026 (to Mayor Keast, Administrator Van Mill, Trustee King and Village Attorney Dunn)
  • Email chain, Memenga and Barrie, June 1 to June 3, 2026 (contains the "2 additions" reference)
  • Email, Additional Stop Signs, Trustee Craig Toepfer, April 25, 2026 (with Chief Morefield's reply)
  • Text message correspondence, Trustee Jack Littrell (produced redacted; the resident's identity is not published here)
  • Ordinance No. 26-2554, executed, adopted July 6, 2026 (six ayes, no nays, no absences)
  • MUTCD 11th Edition, Chapter 2B Sections 2B.06, 2B.12 through 2B.17
  • IDOT Circular Letter 2026-01 Illinois adoption of the 11th Edition, March 2, 2026
  • IDOT Local Roads and Streets Manual, Chapter 39 Section 39-2.08  ·  625 ILCS 5/11-304
  • IDOT Open Data crash portal 2023 and 2024 crash files  ·  Daily Journal, July 7, 2026  ·  WFAV 95.1, July 7, 2026
Research: stop signs and speed control · 6 sources, including the federal manual and FHWA field data
  • MUTCD 11th Edition, Section 2B.06 ¶06 (Standard) "YIELD or STOP signs shall not be used for speed control." Section 2B.07 adds that the decision to install multi-way stop control "should be based on an engineering study," and names as a safety concern "pedestrians, bicyclists, and all road users expecting other road users to stop." Chapter 2B (PDF)
  • Beaubien, R. F., "Stop Signs for Speed Control?" Traffic Engineering, Vol. 46 No. 11, November 1976, pp. 26–28. The original finding. FHWA's own summary: "STOP signs were shown to be ineffective (and frequently ignored) as TCDs for reducing vehicular speeds in residential areas... placing STOP signs for speed control tends to increase peak speeds." Note this paper is often miscited as a 1989 ITE Journal article; Beaubien's 1989 follow-up is a different paper, "Controlling Speeds on Residential Streets," ITE Journal 59(4). TRID record
  • Pietrucha, Opiela, Knoblauch and Crigler, "Motorist Compliance With Standard Traffic Control Devices" FHWA-RD-89-103, Federal Highway Administration, 1989. 528 hours of field observation, 142 sites, 31,212 vehicles: "21,110 failed to stop at a STOP sign... 67.6 percent of the motorists fail to comply." The report also notes the stop sign violation rate "has been over 50 percent since 1935." Full report (PDF)
  • Cottrell, B. H. Jr., "Using All-Way Stop Control for Residential Traffic Management" FHWA/VTRC 96-R17, Virginia Transportation Research Council, 1996. Reviews before-and-after speed studies in Michigan, North Carolina, San Francisco and seven western cities. All found speeds unchanged or slightly increased, with reduction "limited to within 61 m (200 ft) of the intersection." Measured non-compliance of 12, 25 and 43 percent at three intersections. In fairness to the village, this same report concludes that non-compliance at all-way stops has not been found to create a safety problem. Full report (PDF)
  • Noyes, Patricia B., "Responding to Citizen Requests for Multiway Stops" ITE Journal, January 1994. Boulder, Colorado field counts: of 900 vehicles at four-way stops, 23 percent made a full stop; of 350 at three-way stops, 7 percent did. Speeds within a block of the sign were "either unaffected... or actually increase." PDF
  • Woldeamanuel, M., "Stopping Behavior of Drivers at Stop-Controlled Intersections" Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, 51(3), 2012. 2,400 vehicles observed: 35 percent complete stop, 52 percent rolling stop, 13 percent no stop. Also reports, citing a 2003 National Safe Kids Campaign survey of 25,660 vehicles, that "nearly a third of motorists violated the stop signs when child pedestrians were present." PDF
Research: stop signs and pedestrian safety · 6 sources, presented on both sides
  • Lovell, J., and Hauer, E., "The Safety Effect of Conversion to All-Way Stop Control" Transportation Research Record 1068, 1986, pp. 103–107. Evidence in the village's favor. Pedestrian crash reductions of 66 percent (San Francisco), 40 percent (Philadelphia), 42 percent (Toronto), 39 percent combined, corrected for regression to the mean. FHWA's Crash Modification Factor Clearinghouse rates it four stars and the Highway Safety Manual carries it. The Philadelphia dataset (139 pedestrian crashes before, 75 after) is the one carrying real weight; the San Francisco and Toronto pedestrian samples are very small. PDF
  • Simpson, C. L., and Hummer, J. E., "Evaluation of the Conversion from Two-Way Stop Sign Control to All-Way Stop Sign Control at 53 Locations in North Carolina" NCDOT / NC State University, 2010. Also in the village's favor. 68 percent reduction in total crashes, 77 percent in injury crashes, 75 percent in frontal impacts. Rear-end crashes rose 6 percent. Vehicle-to-vehicle only; contains no pedestrian analysis, and the sites studied had existing crash problems. PDF
  • Deng, Kyrychenko, Lee and Retting, "Estimate of the Safety Effect of All-Way Stop Control Conversion in Washington, DC" Transportation Research Record 2674(7), 2020. The one study pointing the other way. 53 conversions: 36 percent fewer crashes overall and 42 percent fewer injury crashes, but "a statistically significant increase in straight hit pedestrian crashes." Read with care. The study controlled for neither traffic volume nor pedestrian exposure, so more people crossing would look the same as more risk, and regression to the mean was not addressed. Abstract
  • Wann, J. P., Poulter, D. R., and Purcell, C., "Reduced Sensitivity to Visual Looming Inflates the Risk Posed by Speeding Vehicles When Children Try to Cross the Road" Psychological Science 22(4), 2011. "Children may not be able to detect vehicles approaching at speeds in excess of 20 mph." A faster car looms less in the visual field, so it can register as not approaching at all. DOI
  • Plumert, J. M., Kearney, J. K., and Cremer, J. F., "Children's Perception of Gap Affordances" Child Development 75(4), 2004. Children chose the same size gaps as adults but executed worse: 1.13 seconds of margin at age 10 versus 1.98 for adults. Of nine collisions in 360 crossings, all but one was a 10-year-old. PDF
  • Zeedyk, M. S., Wallace, L., and Spry, L., "Stop, look, listen, and think? What young children really do when crossing the road" Accident Analysis & Prevention 34(1), 2002. 56 children aged five and six, filmed crossing real roads: 60 percent did not stop at the curb, and no more than 41 percent looked for traffic, dropping as low as 7 percent. DOI
Two claims this page deliberately does not make. First, that unwarranted stop signs increase crashes. That is a common assertion and the evidence does not support it; the Virginia study addresses it directly and rejects it. Second, that stop signs create a proven false sense of security for pedestrians. No study has demonstrated that for stop signs specifically. It is a concern named in the federal manual and in FHWA training material, supported by one study with real methodological gaps, and it is presented here as exactly that.
Where analysis begins. The dates, quotations, vote counts and crash figures on this page are facts drawn from documents. The conclusions in sections 7, 8 and 9 are analysis and are labeled as such. Reasonable people can read the same records and weigh the pedestrian argument differently.

Corrections and responses

Every official named on this page is welcome to respond, and any response will be published here in full and unedited. If something here is wrong it will be corrected promptly and the correction noted. If you have records relevant to these eight intersections, particularly any engineering determination, traffic count or speed study, please send them.